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Uniform DiSclaimerl of, . ... *..
~PropIer Interests
By William P. LaPiana
T he National Conference of Comis- refusing a proffered interest in or For example, a remainder contingent
sioners on Uniform State Laws power over property and the effect of on surviving the holder of the life
(NCCUSL) approved the Uniform that refusal on the power or interest, income interest must be disclaimed
Disclaimer of Property Interests Act UDPIA leaves the tax consequences within nine months of the death of
(UDPIA) on July 29,1999. The new dis- of the refusal to tax law. the life income beneficiary The timne
claimner act replaces three uniform acts The drafting committee also limit for disclaimers of future inter-
promulgated in 1978 (the Uniform Dis- believed that the decision not to ests does not correspond to Code
claimer of Property Interests Act, the include a specific time limit-to § 2518, which generally requires that
Uniformn Disclaimer of Transfers by "decouple" the disclaimer statute a qualified disclaimer of a future
Will, Intestacy or Appointmnent Act from the timre requirement for a interest be made within nine months
and the Uniformn Disclaimner of Trans- "1qualified disclaimer" under Code of the interest's creation, no matter
fers uinder Nontestamentary lnstru- § 2518-would reduce confusion. how contingent it may be.
men ts Act) and will be incor porated The older uniform acts and almost all The nine mronth time limnit of the
into the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) the current state statutes (many of existing statutes really is a trap. Al-
to replace current UPC § 2-801. UDPJA which are based on those acts) were though it superficially conforms to
is the most comprehensive disclaimer drafted in the wake of the passage of Code § 2518, its application to the dis-
statute ever written and is designed to Code § 2518 in 1976. That gift tax claimer of future interests does not.
allow every sort of disclaimer that is provision replaced the "reasonable The UDPIA drafting committee hoped
useful for tax planning purposes. time" requirement of prior law with that, by removing all mention of time
a requirement that a disclaimer must limits, the statute itself would signalNine Month Time Limit be made within nine months of the that different law sets the require-
creation of the interest disclaimed, if ments for a tax qualified disclaimer.
UDPIA does not include a specific the disclaimer is to be a "qualified
timne limit for making any disclaimer disclaimer"-one that is not regarded Relates Back
and makes no reference to the nine as a transfer by the disclaimiant.
month limidt of Code § 2518. At the The statutes that were written in UDPIA reads differently from
beginininig of the drafting process, response to Code § 2518 reflected the current disclaimer statutes because
the NCCUSL drafting committee nine month time limit that Code sec- it abandons the term "relates back."
decided that the new act would reflect tion established. Under most of these Courts ha ve interpreted that term to
the basic concept underlying all dis- statutes (including the 1978 uniform mean that the disclaimer takes effect
claimners: no one can be forced to acts and UPC § 2-801), a disclaimer as a refusal at that time, thus prevent-
accept a gift. The only bar to a dis- must be mnade within nine months ing- the disdlaimant from transferring
claimer, therefore, should be accep- of the creation of a present interest. the interest. UDPIA adopts this
lance of the offer. This decision recog- Freapeadicimroanut itrrtto.Rather than using the
nizes that, in almost all jurisdictions, right gift under a will must be made term "relates back," however, UDPIA
disclaimers can be used for more than within nine months of the decedent's makes disclaimers effective at the
tax planninig. A proper disclaimer will death, corresponding to the require- time when the offer of the gift is irrev-
often keep the disclaimed property ment of Code § 2518. A future interest, ocable. For example, a disclaimer of a
from the disdlaimant's creditors. In1 however, may be disclaimed within gift under a will is "effective" when
short, the new act is a type of enabling nine months of the time that the inter- the will becomes irrevocable at the
act that prescribes all of the rules for est vests in possession or enjoyment. death of the testator. In addition,
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§ 4(f) states that a disclaimer "is not Disclaimer of Interestin~ also create a special rule for joint ten-
a transfer, assignment, or release." oit"edPrei ancies between spouses created after
Taken tog-ether, the time of effective- July 14, 1988, wheni the spouse of the
ness provisions and § 4(f) clearly The most important new provision donor is not a U.S. citizen. In that
state the meaning of a disclaimer dealing with the disclaimer of inter- case, the donee spouse may disclaim
as a refusal. ests in property is § 7, "Disclaimer of any portion of the joint tenancy
Interest in Jointly Held Property." includable in the donor spouse's
Disclaimer of Trustee Powers Although existing statutes usually gross estate under Code § 2040, which
mention the possibility of disclaiming creates a contribution rule. Thus, the
UDPIA creates rules not only for jointly held property, they do not pro- surviving non-citizen spouse may
the disclaimer of interests in property, vide details. Any disclaimer of joint disclaim all of the joint tenancy
but also for the disclaimer of powers tenancy or tenancy by the entirety property if the deceased spouse
over property The act includes sections property is an anomalous concept in provided all of the consideration for
devoted to the disclaimer of powers propert-y law terms. At the death of the tenancy's creation.
not held in a fiduciary capacity one joint holder, nothing really Treas. Reg. § 25.251 8-2(c) (4) (iii)
(powers of appointment) (§ 9) and of "1passes" to the survivor. The tradi- also recognizes the unique features of
powers held in a fiduciary capacity tional common law view is that the joint bank accounts. The regulations
(§ 11). Trustees may have tax motives survivor has been "freed of the partici- permit the disclaimer by a survivor
for surrendering powers. For example, pation" of the other joint tenant. Nev- of that part of the account that the
a trust for the primary benefit of a stir- ertheless, courts have interpreted the decedent contributed, so long as the
viving spouse will not qualify for the existing disclaimer statutes as contem- decedent could have regained that
marital deduction if the trustee has the plating the disclaimer of at least the portion during life by unilateral
power to invade principal for others. "1accretive portion" of the joint ten- action. The regulations bar the dis-
If the trustee effectively disclaims the ancy-that part of the property that claimer of that part of the account
power, the trust mnight then qualify the decedent would have received had attributable to the survivor's contri-
for the marital deduction uinder Code the tenancy been severed unmilaterally. bution and explicitly extend the rule
§ 2056. Trustees have, in general, had See Dancy z7. Coimm'r, 872 F.2d 84 (4th governing joint bank accounts to
difficulty disclaimiing powers. The Cir. 1989); McDoniald v. Comm'r, 853 brokerage and other investment
courts usually decide that the trustee F.2d 1494 (8th Cir. 1988); Kenned~y v. accounts, such as mutual fund
must accept the trust as created or Coimm'r, 804 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1986); accounts, held in joint namne.
decline to be trustee. In contrast, IM re Estate of Lamnoureux, 412 N.W.2d Section 7 was drafted to allow
UDPIA gives trustees the ability to 628 (Iowa 1987). Holdings such as every sort of qualified disclaimer of
make such disclaimers. Any disclaimer these, of course, give little help to ten- jointly held property possible under
by a trustee must, of course, comport ants by the entirety who cannot make the Treasury Regulations. Section
with the trustee's fiduciary duty. a unilateral severance. IRS rulings 2(5) defines jointly held property to
have generally, albeit reluctantly, include joint tenancies and tenancies
Disclaimer of Property followed these cases, allowing the by the entirety as well as all other
Added to Trust disclaimer of the severable portion, sorts of joint arrangements by stating:
A surviving tenant by the entirety, of " 'Jointly held property' means prop-
Disclaimers of additions of prop- course, could not make a qualified erty held in the name of two or more
erty to a trust are also the subject of disclaimer under these rulings, persons unider ani arrangement in
innovative provisions. UDPIA § 5 The IRS ended the controversy in which allI holders have concurrent
allows trustees to disclaim property late 1997 when it promulgated new interests and under which the last sur-
that would otherwise be added to a final regulations under Code § 2518. viving holder is entitled to the whole
trust. Such disclaimers have been Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(4)(i) allows a of the property." A surviving holder
hampered by the same reasoning that surviving joint tenant or tenant by the of joint property may disclaim the
has held back potentially useful entirety to disclaim that portion of the greater of a fractional portion of the
disclaimers of fiduciary powers. For tenancy to which he or she succeeds property, determined by dividing the
example, a trustee might wish to on the death of the first joint tenant number one by the number of joint
disclaim an addition to a trust that (when there are two joint tenants), holders immediately before the death
would otherwise lead to the imposi- whether or not the tenancy could of the holder giving rise to the oppor-
tion of the generation-skipping trans- have been unilaterally severed under tuntity to disclaim, and that portion of
fer tax. Again, any disclaimer of a local law and regardless of the pro- the jointly held property not attribut-
property interest by a trustee must com- portion of consideration that the dis- able to the contribution of the dis-
port with the trustee's fiduciary duty. claimant furnished. The regulationis claimant. A surviving spouse who
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Ihe ;n ine mo n time lii f the exsing stottes The time of distribution of a future
II I R111 'I 'IIinterest is the time when it comes into
reoii'y is a -rop, IAIMflo-u9Jh i 5upemaIT-kry (OflJ,1i'mS 10 possession. Previous uiform acts and
r UPC § 2-801 provided that a dis-
Lode8 1 5 1 i I ica o _2nttclaimiant would be treated as prede-Code§ 218,ifsappicoion o te dscl~im r fceasing the creation of the futurefuture interestsa oesl notJ interest (frexample, the death of the
decedent if the interest was in a
4 6 Is 0a a ,,6 0 1, ,, ,4,,t,6e., e* .41* ,, testamentary trust). That approach
leads to an ambiguity. Assume that
contributed all the consideration for usually when the instrument creating T's will creates a testamentary trust
the purchase of the family home held the interest becomes irrevocable, for A, who is to receive all of the
in joint tenancy could disclaim one- income for life. At A's death, the trust
half of the property. Had the surviv- Iffective lime of Disclaimer is to be distributed to T's descendants
ing spouse contributed nothing, he or by representation. A is survived by T's
she could disclaim as much as all of Under UDPJA, unless the instru- son S and daughter D. S has two
the property, although a qualified ment provides for the disposition of living children and D has one child. S
disclaimer would be limited to the disclaimed interest should it be decides that he would prefer his share
one-half. disclaimed or for the disposition of of the truLst to pass to his children and
The surviving holder of a joint disclaimed interests in general disclaims. The disclaimer must be
account who contributed nothing to (§ 6(b)(2)), the disclaimed interest made withini nine months of T's death
the account could disclaim the entire passes as if the disclaimant had died if it is to be a qualified disclaimer for
account. The disclaimer would be a imimediately before the time of tax purposes. Under prior acts and
qualified disclaimer under the regula- distribution of the interest under UPC § 2-801, the interest passes as if
tions so long as the other requirements § 6(b)(3)(A). Section 6(a)(1) defines S had predeceased T.
of Code § 2518 are met. The dis- time of distribution as "the time when A problem can arise if S is sur-
claimant is deemed to have prede- a disclaimed interest would have vived by children born after T's deathi.
ceased the last of the other joint hold- taken effect in possession or enjoy- It is possible to argue that, had S pre-
ers to die. In the case of spousal joint ment. " "Possession" and "enjoyment" deceased T, the afterborni child would
tenants, the decedent then would be are, of course, terms of art from the not exist and that D and S's two chil-
the deemed survivor. The disclaimed law of future interests and describe dren living at the time of T's death are
portion would pass through his or her the time at which it is certain to whom entitled to all of the trust property
estate and could help the estate take property belongs. The terms do not Under § 6(b)(3)(A), however, S is
advantage of the uni-ified credit. mean that the person actually has the deemed to have died immediately
The provisions of UDPIA dealing property in hand. For example, the before A's death, even though under
with the disclaimer of interests in time of distribution of present inter- § 6(b)(1) the disclaimer is effective as
property, other than disclaimers byT ests created by will and of all initerests of T's death. There is no doubt, there-
trustees, also differ from previous arising- under the law of intestate suc- fore, that S's children living at the
statutes. Section 6 governs all such cession is the date of the decedent's time of distribution, whenever borni,
disclaimers, whether the disclaimed death. At that moment, the heir or are entitled to the share of the trust
interest was created by will, under devisee is entitled to his or-her devise property he would have received.
initestacy law or by a nontestamentary or share. It is irrelevant that time will In thle above example, it is clear
instrument. The old uniform acts, pass before the will is admitted to that S's children should receive
UPC § 2-801, an-d almost all state probate and that actual receipt of the exactly what S would have received
statutes deal separately with dis- gift may not occur until the adminis- had he not disclaimed. Section
claimers of testamentary and nontes- tration of the estate is complete. The 6(b)(3)(A) ensures that result by
tamentary interests. The separation time of distribution of present inter- -requiring that the disclaimed interest
reflects the need to select a time at ests created by nontestamentary -pass as if the disclaimant had died.
which the disclaimnant is deemed to instrunients generally depends on -This provision in turn ensures that a
hav e died to determine how the dis- when the instrument becomes irrevo- disclaimer cannot alter the representa-
claimed interest passes, absent a - cable. Because the recipient of a present tional scheme of a multigenerational
direction in the inistrument. For interest is entitled to the property as - gift or the intestacy statute. The classic
testamentary interests, the time has - soon as the gift is made, the time of example is the disclaimer by an older
always been the death of the dece- distribution occurs when the creator of generation representative whose ch-il-
dent. For other interests, the timne is the interest can no longer take it back. dren outnumber those of her deceased
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"he regulations permit the disclaimer by a survivor of
that par 0f the account that the decedent contributed,
so long as the decedent could have regained that portion
during life by unilateral action. t
sibling,. For example, X dies in testa te,
survived by daughter D, her three chil-
dren and the only child of predeceased
son S. D disclaims. Were D deemed
simply to have predeceased X, her chil-
dren could argue that they were enti-
tled to three-fourths; of the estate
because all the heirs are now in the
same generation. Courts have rejected
this interpretation of deemed death,
taking the position that the disclaimer
should only allow the passing of what
the disdlaimnant would otherwise have
taken. See, e.g., Welder v. Hitchcock, 617
S.W2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Estate
of Fien ga, 347 N.YS.2d 150 (Surr. Ct.
1973). UDPJA agrees with that positi on.
Preventing the use of a disclaimer
to alter the shares of an intestate estate
or of a multigenerational gift by limit-
ing the effect of the disclaimer to the
disclaimed interest solves one problem
but creates another. In the example
in the previous paragraph, if the
disclaimed interest passes as if D
predeceased X, S's child could claim
one-fourth of the interest because,
once again, all of the heirs would be in
the same generation. UDPIA prevents
that result by adapting language from
UPC § 2-801, providing that if the dis-
claimant's descendants would have
shared in the disclaimed interest had
the disclaimant predeceased (in this
example with their cousin, S's child),
then the interest passes only to the
disclaimant's descendants.
The concept of the disclaimer as a
deemed death follows the approach
that existing statutes take. Just as
under those statutes, the result of a
disclaimer of an interest created under
a will is seldomn in doubt under § 6.
Even if the will does not provide for
the death of the disclaimant before the
testator, the doctrine of lapse and anti-
lapse statutes will give a clear answer.
The law of lapse as it applies to non-
testamentary instruments and the
interests they create is far less certain.
In the absence of comprehensive lapse
provisions like UPC §§ 2-603, 2-706
and 2-707, general principles may dic-
tate the exact result of the disclaimer
of an interest created in an instrument
other than a will. Unfortunately, the
exact application of those general prin-




Section 6(b)(3)(B) provides a rule for
the passing of property interests dis-
claimed by persons other than individ-
uals. Because § 8 applies to disclaimers
by trustees of property that would oth-
erwise pass to the trust, this paragraph
principally applies to disclaimers by
corporations, partnerships and the
other entities listed in the definition of
"person" in § 2(b). A charity, for exam-
ple, might wish to disclaim property if
acceptance of the property would be
incompatible with its purposes.
Acceleration of Future Interests
Section 6(b)(4) continues the
approach taken in prior uniform acts
and UPC § 2-801 that provides for the
acceleration of future interests on the
making of a disclaimer. For example,
Father's will creates a testamentary
trust to pay income to his son S for
his life, and on his death to pay the
remainder to S's descendants then
living, by representation. If S disclaims
his life income interest in the trust, the
remainder will immediately become
possessory in S's descendants deter-
mined as of Father's death, just as if S
really had not survived. It is immater-
ial that the actual situation at S's death
might be different, with different
descendants entitled to the remainder.
Disclaimers of
Powers of Appointments
Section 9 deals with disclaimers
by holders of powers of appoint-
ment and § 10 with disclaimers by
appointees, permissible appointees
and takers in default. A properly
disclaimed power ceases to exist as
of the time the disclaimer becomes
effective, which in turn depends on
what sort of power is involved and
whether or not it has been exercised.
If a holder disclaims a power before
exercising it, the disclaimer takes
effect at the time that the instrument
creating the power became irrevoca-
ble and the disclaimer destroys the
power. If the holder has exercised the
power, the disclaimer takes effect
immediately after the last exercise of
the power. The power ceases to exist
from that time forward, unless the
power is a presently exercisable
general power of appointment. Once
exercised, such a power cannot be dis-
claimed. This is the only provision in
UDPIA that makes a specific act suffi-
cient to bar a subsequent disclaimer.
Section 10 makes a disclaimer by
an appointee take effect as of the
time that the instrument by which
the holder exercises the power
becomes irrevocable. Disclaimers by
objects and takers in default take
effect as of the time the instrument
creatinig the power becomes ir revoca-
ble. The effect of the disclaimer is the
same as that of any disclaimer of an
interest of property under § 6. The
disclaimed interest will pass accord-
ing to the explicit provisions of the
instrument exercising or creating the
power or under the default rule of
Probate & Property
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Keeping Current-Probate offers a look at selected recent
cases, rulings and regulations, literature and legislation.
The editors of Probate & Property welcome suggestions
and contributions from readers.
* TAX APPORTIONMENT: Will provision prevails over
statutory apportionment. The decedent's will directed that
all death taxes be paid from the residue and defined death
taxes to include all estate, inheritance and succession
taxes "which are assessed by reason of my death." In
Peterson v. Mayse, 993 S.W2d 217 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), the
court held that the apportionment clause overrode the
statutory apportionment rule.
* EQUITABLE ADOPTION: Proof must be by clear and
convincing evidence. In Williams v. Estate of Pender, 738
So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), the court required clear
and convincing evidence of each of the five elements of
equitable adoption: 1) agreement to adopt, 2) performance
by the natural parents by surrender of custody, 3) perfor-
mance by child by living in the home of the foster parents,
4) partial performance by the foster parents by taking the
child into their home and treating the child as their own
and 5) intestacy of the foster parents. For a similar holding,
see Welch v. Wilson, 516 S.E.2d 35 (W Va. 1999).
9 REPUBLICATION BY CODICIL: Post-marriage codicil
republishes premarital will. A testator executed his will
and married his wife later that day. He subsequently
adopted his wife's child. After the adoption the testator
executed two codicils. His wife alleged that the will was
revoked by a state statute providing that a subsequent
marriage and birth or adoption of a child revokes a pre-
marital will. The court in In re Estate of Wells, 983 P.2d 279
(Kan. Ct. App. 1999), held the will effective because it was
republished by codicil after the marriage and adoption.
* ATTORNEY'S FEES: Executor's undue influence pre-
cludes payment from estate. A will was denied probate
because the executor exercised undue influence over the
decedent. That executor moved for payment of his lawyer's
fees from the estate, but the court denied the fee applica-
tion. In re Estate of Herbert, 979 P.2d 1133 (Haw. 1999).
a DOMICILE: Decedent's intent outweighs physical loca-
tion of property. The decedent's estate was administered in
Massachusetts. An after-death survey of the decedent's
property revealed that 11% of the property including his
house, was actually located in Connecticut. The court in
Bernier v. DuPont, 715 N.E.2d 442 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999),
held that the decedent intended to reside in Massachusetts
and Massachusetts courts had jurisdiction based on the
decedent's domicile.
* PRETERMITTED CHILD: Nonmarital child entitled to
forced share. A decedent's will was executed before the
birth of his child. Although the child's mother was married
to someone else at the time of the child's birth, the court
held that the child qualified as a pretermitted child
because there was clear and convincing evidence of
paternity overcoming the presumption that the mother's
husband was the child's father In re Matter of Wilkins, 691
N.YS.2d 878 (N.Y Surr. Ct. 1999).
* GST TAX: Failure to allocate exemption on Schedule R
excused under substantial compliance doctrine. PLR
199937026.
* INCOME TAX BASIS: Beneficiary not estopped from
claiming a stepped up basis greater than the fair market
value of the asset shown on the estate tax return. TAM
199933001.
* MARITAL DEDUCTION: Savings clause in deceased
spouse's will sufficient to support interpretation limiting
distribution to surviving spouse consistent with marital
deduction rules. TAM 199932001.
* POWER OF APPOINTMENT: Trustee's power to amend
a trust determined not to be a general power because
the trustee had no beneficial interest in the trust and
the grantor's intent was to benefit the trustee's children.
FSA 199830026.
e VALUATION: Special valuation rules of Code § 2701
may apply to formation of a partnership. TAM
199933002.
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* Asset protection trusts. Recent articles discussing asset
protection trusts include David Aronofsk, Montana's For-
eign Capital Depository Act: A Financial Pie in the Rocky
Mountain Sky or a Sensible New Assets Attraction
Approach?, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 711 (1999); Eric Henzy,
Offshore and "Other" Shore Asset Protection Trusts, 32
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 739 (1999); Gideon Rothschild et al.,
Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts: Should a Few Bad Apples
Spoil the Bunch?, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 763 (1999); Amy
Lynn Wagenfeld, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware
Compete for the Asset Protection Trust Market and the
Wealth that Follows, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 831 (1999).
0 Attorney-client privilege. For a discussion of the posthu-
mous application of the privilege, see Forrest Shea Brown-
ing, Swidler & Berlin v. United States: A Grave Decision-
When Does Attorney-Client Privilege Have a Life of its
Own?, 22 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 671 (1999).
e Body disposition. Jennifer E. Horan recommends a func-
tional approach to family status for same-sex couples
when disposing of remains in "When Sleep at Last Has
Come": Controlling the Disposition of Dead Bodies for
Same-Sex Couples, 2 J. Race, Gender & Just. 423 (1999).
* Charitable trusts. Recent articles include: Jonathan Gop-
man and Daniel Mielnicki, New Perspectives in Planning
with Testamentary Charitable Lead Annuity Trusts, Tr. &
Est. 46 (June 1999); Paula Kilcoyne, Charitable Trusts -
Donor Standing Under the Uniform Management of Insti-
tutional Funds Act in Light of Carl J. Herzog Foundation,
Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 21 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 131
(1999); Conrad Teitell, Charitable Remainder Trusts-Final
Regulations, Tr. & Est. 36 (Aug. 1999).
- Conservation easements. For a review of conservation
easements benefits, see Brenda J. Brown's Land Preserva-
tion Provides Estate Tax Benefits: Section 2031(c), 17 UCLA
J. Envl. L. & Pol'y 117 (1998).
* Contracts to make a will. Jason Thomas King recom-
mends a constructive trust remedy rather than enforcing a
promise to make a will in Lifetime Remedies for Breach of
a Contract to Make a Will, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 965 (1999).
o Defamation after death. Raymond Iryami discusses the
history and recent developments related to the departed's
reputation rights in Give the Dead Their Day in Court:
Implying a Private Cause of Action for Defamation of the
Dead from Criminal Libel Statutes, 9 Fordham Intell Prop.
Media & Ent. L.J. 1083 (1999).
e Family-owned businesses. Recent articles focusing on
family-owned businesses include: Shannon E. O'Brien,
Estate Tax Treatment of Family-Owned Businesses: The
Evolution of Internal Revenue Code Section 2057,67
UMKC L. Rev. 495 (1999); Sebastian V. Grassi Jr., Drafting for
the Family-Owned Business Deduction, 90 J. Tax'n 358
(1999); and Neil E. Harl, The Family-Owned Business
Deduction: Still in Need of Repairs, Drake J. Agric. L. 59
(Spring 1999).
* Foreign trust taxation. Donald D. Kozusko and Stephen
K. Vetter question Respect for "Form" as "Substance" in
U.S. Taxation of International Trusts, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l
L. 675 (1999). Carlyn S. McCaffrey & Elyse G. Kirschner dis-
cuss foreign trusts and the requirements they impose in
Learning to Live with the New Foreign Nongrantor Trust
Rules, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 555 (1999).
* Limited liability companies. For a review of limited lia-
bility companies, see Thomas W Jacobs and Thomas J.
Callahan, What Tax Lawyers Need to Know About Single
Member Limited Liability Companies, Prac. Tax
Law. 7 (Summer 1999).
* Long-term care insurance. Robert D. Hayes, Nancy G.
Boyd and Kenneth W, Hollman stress the importance of
advising elderly clients to purchase insurance packages in
What Attorneys Should Know About Long-Term Care
Insurance, 7 Elder L.J. 1 (1999).
e Medicaid. Omar N. Ahmad provides an overview of the
Medicaid program and discusses the "income-first" rule in
Medicaid Eligibility Rules for the Elderly Long-Term Care
Applicant, History and Developments, 1965-1998, 20 J. Legal
Med. 251 (1999).
* Negligent trust situs. A possible new tort is discussed in
Michael J. Myers and Rollyn H. Samp, South Dakota Trust
Amendments and Economic Development: The Tort of
"Negligent Trust Situs" at its Incipient Stage, 44 S.D. L. Rev.
662 (1998).
* Omitted spouse. David E. Wagner explores South Car-
olina's omitted spouse statute in The South Carolina Pro-
bate Code Omitted Spouse Statute and In Re Estate of
Timmerman, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 979 (1999).
e Professional athletes. For a view of estate planning for
the professional athlete, see Joseph D. Wright's Skyrocket-
ing Dollars and the Tax Reform Act of 1997: Estate Plan-
ning for the Professional Athlete in a New Millennium, 6
Sports Law J. 27 (1999).
0 Professional responsibility. The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's School shares its experience in TJAGSA Practice
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Note: Wills and Professional Responsibility Notes, Army
Law. 30 (July 1999).
* Purpose trusts. Adam J. Hirsch reviews the purpose trust
provisions of the UPC in Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambi-
guity and Anomaly in the Uniform Laws, 26 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 913 (1999).
* QTIP election. June R. Kitagawa examines Code
§ 2056 in QTIP Election Invalid Where the Will Allowed
Reduction in the Surviving Spouse's Interests: Estate of
Rinaldi v. United States, 52 Tax Law. 617 (1999).
* Qualified retirement plan. Louis S. Harrison shares his
methods for minimizing at-death transfers of tax-deferred
assets in Creative and Strategic Estate Planning for Trans-
fer of Qualified Retirement Assets, 87 111. B.J. 480 (1999).
* Tax liens on inherited property. Andrew J. Lawrence rec-
ommends strategies in State Law Disclaimer Did Not Pre-
vent the Attachment of Federal Tax Liens to Inherited Prop-
erty: Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United States, 52 Tax Law.
627 (1999).
a Tax returns. Glen A. Yale shares his instructions and
checklist in Obtaining Information to Complete the Form
706, Prac. Tax Law. 29 (Summer 1999).
o Trust companies. Anne Luke Boozer, Hal Pennington and
William W. Rodgers discuss the trust industry in Case Study:
A Trust Culture That Works, Tr. & Est. 28 (Aug. 1999).
* Trust taxation. Robert T. Danforth offers A Proposal for
Integrating the Income and Transfer Taxation of Trusts in
18 Va. Tax Rev. 545 (1999).
9 Trusts. For an overview of recent developments, see
Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Significant Trends in the Trust Law
of the United States, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 531 (1999).
o Undue influence. Brian Alan Ross argues that a woman's
testamentary choices are often overruled as punishment
for her challenging traditional gender roles in Undue
Influence and Gender Inequity, 19 Women's Rts. L. Rep.
97 (1997).
* Uniform prudent investor Act. Martin D. Begleiter shares
the results of his study in Does the Prudent Investor Need
the Uniform Prudent Investor Act -An Empirical Study of
Trust Investment Practices, 51 Me. L. Rev. 28 (1999).
* Valuation of lottery winnings. Ja Lee Kao focuses on
Valuing Future Lottery Winnings for Estate Tax Purposes:
Estate of Shackleford v. United States, 52 Tax Law.
609 (1999).
e Viatical settlements. Miriam R. Albert's proposal for
decreasing fraudulent viatical settlements is found in The
Future of Death Futures: Why Viatical Settlements Must be
Classified as Securities, 19 Pace L. Rev. 345 (1999).
e Will contests. Ronald Chester examines mediation as an
alternative to will contests in Less Law, But More Justice?:
Jury Trials and Mediation as Means of Resolving Will Con-
tests, 37 Duq. L. Rev. 173 (1999).
e California authorizes nonprofit charitable corporations
to be appointed as trustees under specified circum-
stances. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 424.
* California creates statewide registry for guardians and
conservators. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 409.
o California establishes presumption that transfer of
community and quasi-community property to a revocable
trust is an agreement that those assets retain their char-
acter. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 263.
0 California revises creditor claims procedures. 1999 Cal.
Legis Serv. ch. 263.
* Illinois prohibits discrimination of recipients of donated
organs based on potential donee's disability. 1999 Ill.
Legis. Serv. PA. 91-345.
Illinois requires reporting of charitable trust for the ben-
efit of a minor or a disabled person to the person's parent
or guardian. 1999 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 91-620.
* New York revises estate tax apportionment statute
relating to qualified terminable interest property. 1999
N.Y Legis. ch. 380.
• North Carolina clarifies the circumstances under which
an agent may make gifts under a durable power of attor-
ney. N.C. Laws S.L. 1999-385.
* Ohio revises probate laws, including will revocation
and bonding requirements. 1999 Ohio Legis. file 71.
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Editorial Policy
Probate & Property is designed to assist
lawyers practicing in the areas of real
estate, wills, trusts and estates by provid-
ing articles and editorial matter written
in a readable and informative style. The
articles, other editorial content and ad-
vertisements are intended to give up-to-
date, practical information that will aid
lawyers in giving their clients accurate,
prompt and efficient service.
The views expressed herein have
not been approved by the House of
Delegates or the Board of Governors
of the American Bar Association and,
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